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ABSTRACT 
 China is currently the second-largest film audience market in the world and is set 
to surpass the U.S. market by 2020. China’s lucrative market is controlled by Beijing’s 
state, which permits only the release of films that place China in a positive light. 
Meanwhile, China has nefariously sought U.S. technology through spying, specifically 
targeting the space industry where China has emerged as the strongest competitor to the 
United States. This thesis examines China’s intentions of controlling narratives and 
stealing or co-opting media tradecraft and capabilities through the use of its markets and 
investment. Six Hollywood films are examined to understand the nature of China’s 
expanding sharp power into United States through Hollywood. This thesis concludes that 
by controlling Hollywood, China may be positioned to shape perceptions of the U.S. 
society, which is susceptible to propaganda particularly coming from American sources. 
This research concludes with three recommendations to help control or mitigate the 
Chinese threat. 
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This thesis is a resource for homeland security leadership regarding the threat of 
expanding Chinese soft power into the United States through Hollywood, which is an 
important communication mechanism and public sphere to influence and inform the American 
public. The thesis answers the following question: How does China’s interaction with 
Hollywood pose a threat to national security?  
China is a threat to the United States through its military (hard power), economic 
ventures (soft power), and propaganda (sharp power). China uses each of these three forms of 
power to achieve dominance in the global political arena. Bill Evanina, an FBI agent and 
Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, understands the threat of 
China and in July 2015 said, “economic security is national security.”1 As China seeks to 
increase its power, it benefits from its illegal activities such as theft of trade secrets from the 
U.S. military and other industries. Specifically, China has used spies to steal secrets from U.S. 
companies such as Dupont, Valspar, and Lockheed Martin, and as a result, has been able to 
expand technologically in the global markets.2 At the same time, China has adopted 
protectionist policies at a domestic level that benefit its own industries, causing U.S. 
industries—including Hollywood—to vie for access to the Chinese market. One of such rules 
is allowing only 34 U.S. films per year into China. 
While the Chinese model of theft and economically invasive conduct are well 
documented and understood among the U.S. intelligence community, the private sector has yet 
to recognize the full nature of China’s security threat to the United States; this is problematic 
because it leaves open vulnerabilities in the American economy and democracy. Hollywood is 
such a case. A central hypothesis presented in this research is that China’s increasing economic 
ownership and its role as an important market for Hollywood serves its goals of domination 
through propaganda and constitutes a threat to U.S. national security.  
                                                 




A content analysis of six space-related films produced between 2013 and 2016 is 
intended to illustrate China’s impact on American media and its audience. The purpose is to 
understand China’s further ingress into U.S. innovation and democracy by cultivating a non-
threatening image. Space-themed films were chosen because China is well recognized for 
targeting U.S. space program technology. China’s use of space-related films that portray the 
United States and China as collaborators rather than competitors seeks to acclimatize the U.S. 
public to the threat of Chinese space activities. The focus of space films also stems from U.S.–
Chinese competition as global leaders in space. The space program represents great 
technological achievements and pride among both the United States and China, and a focus on 
films in this area helped illustrate the expansion of China’s influence.  
The findings of these case studies are that recent portrayals of China in Hollywood as 
a benevolent partner in space programs, thanks to the strength of China’s investments and 
market, contribute to China’s exercise of soft power and afford access to U.S. technology and 
restricted information. Understanding this emerging threat suggests a need for future research, 
which may result in a more aggressive strategy to counter China’s influence. Ultimately, this 
thesis produces three recommendations for members of the intelligence and national security 
community to mitigate the potential threat, including rejecting the 34-film cap, building 
information-sharing and collaborative relationships with Hollywood to help it protect itself, 
and changing the perception of American viewers toward China. 
The United States needs to recognize Beijing’s use of soft power in shaping U.S. public 
opinion through influencing the U.S. entertainment industry and correspondingly curb China’s 
exploitation of Hollywood. This exploitation has geopolitical and geo-economic implications 
that degrade elements of U.S. power. China’s growing influence in Hollywood necessitates 
new approaches and industry partnerships to protect the United States from Beijing’s 
expanding influence. China’s infiltration of content and distribution can influence public 
opinion, which provides the context and drivers for U.S. government policymaking. Thus, the 
threat is that the U.S. government—because of a misled and manipulated population—will act 
against its interests.  
xv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
My thesis and completion of studies at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security 
at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) would not have been possible without the support 
of those who continually inspired me to be better. If you are reading this and know me, you 
are most likely one of the people whom I’ve admired at different points in my life. Through 
your wisdom, demeanor, and example, I have continually sought to make a difference in this 
world by helping others. Whether it be protecting the United States from foreign adversaries 
or simply volunteering in the church and the community, I seek these things.  
While I have many accomplishments in my life, both personally and professionally, 
I also understand, as David O’McKay said, “No other success can compensate for failure in 
the home.” I owe a tremendous amount of gratitude to my wife, Kastell, and our four 
children, Jagger, Liberty, Gunner, and Sawyer, who have made this opportunity possible 
through their unwavering support and complete understanding of the moments I just couldn’t 
be there. Now, I’ll be able to help with their homework instead of them helping me with 
mine. 
My time at NPS has been a difficult, time-consuming endeavor that has yielded 
unique partnerships and lifelong friendships—not to mention a more in-depth understanding 
of my classmates from Cohort 1701/1702 and the agencies they represent that relentlessly 
fight to protect our homeland. Their love of and their devotion and commitment to the United 
States are what keep us safe in our communities.  
I would like to thank my parents, Eldon and Shelly Larson, and my in-laws, Art and 
Pati Kent, who have set a tremendous example of balancing life’s commitments with family 
responsibilities. Together, they have accumulated over 100 years of marriage, setting a strong 
example, and they are still going strong. 
I sincerely thank the Federal Bureau of Investigation for the opportunity to serve for 
the last 22 years. It has truly been the cure for the common career, and I have been privileged 
to be a part of that family. It has not always been easy, but it has always been worth it. 
  
xvi 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
1 
I. CHINA’S PROPAGANDA STRATEGY 
China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its 
neighbors. 
 —U.S. Department of Defense1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The U.S. intelligence community (USIC) increasingly perceives China as a 
significant threat to U.S. national security interests.2 China is pursuing its strategy to 
become a dominant global power applying various nuanced strategies; China’s strategy 
relies on acquisition rather than destruction as well as the deployment of soft and sharp 
power.3 For example, China is a well-documented violator of intellectual property rights 
and has committed egregious acts of state-sponsored economic espionage.4 China also 
employs propaganda to influence Americans and others around the world.  
While the Chinese propaganda machine, theft, and economically aggressive 
conduct are well documented and understood in the USIC, the private sector has yet to 
acknowledge or respond to China’s security threat to the United States. One important 
sector that appears to be affected by the growing Chinese soft power is Hollywood. A 
central hypothesis presented in this research is that China’s increasing economic ownership 
of Hollywood and expanding markets constitute a threat to U.S. national security through 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense, 2018), 14. 
2 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. 
3 David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push,” Foreign Affairs, June 16, 2015, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push. 
4 Department of Justice, “Chinese National Pleads Guilty to Economic Espionage and Theft of a Trade 




an industry that has traditionally served as a source of American propaganda and strategic 
communication.5 
This potential use of media to influence public opinion is an example of what 
Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig of the National Endowment for Democracy 
characterize as China’s “sharp power.”6 Although this term is still being defined and many 
still see it as synonymous with soft power, sharp power is described by Walker and Ludwig 
as the middle space where manipulation and pressure occur between two countries.7 Some 
specialists in Chinese politics and global expansion point to Beijing’s use of sharp power 
to “guide, buy or coerce political influence.”8  
This thesis expands an understanding of how China uses both soft and sharp power 
in Hollywood, a media sector essential to the interests of the United States. It sheds light 
on China’s involvement in studios or with individual directors because of its investment 
power and lucrative film market. It also shows how China can parlay that involvement to 
influence the development of film content that shapes how Americans and others think. By 
focusing on this strategy, which appears to be expanding, the USIC, Hollywood 
stakeholders, and the American public will be able to recognize China’s influence and 
respond accordingly. This thesis also makes recommendations for potential U.S. 
responses—once Chinese influence is recognized—that range from changing U.S. private-
sector business practices to expanding the United States’ understanding of national security 
and adoption of appropriate policy solutions, such as reexamining the role of the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.  
                                                 
5 Stephen Van Evera, “Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror,” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 607 (September 2006): 10–11. 
6 Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, “From ‘Soft Power’ to ‘Sharp Power’: Rising Authoritarian 
Influence in the Democratic World,” in Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence, ed. Juan Pablo 
Cardenal et al. (Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy and International Forum for 
Democratic Studies, 2017), 1, https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence-forum-
report/. 
7 Walker and Ludwig, 1. 
8 Anne-Marie Brady, “Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping,” 
Wilson Center, September 16, 2017, 2, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/
for_website_magicweaponsanne-mariesbradyseptember2017.pdf. 
3 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How does China’s interaction with Hollywood pose a threat to national security? 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review addresses four issues related to the advancement of Chinese 
soft power in the U.S. public sphere. The first covers China’s emerging threat as a global 
leader; the second, soft power and its importance; the third, the importance of media in a 
democracy; and the fourth, propaganda and its use in media. All four of these issues are 
central to the question of how China is using soft power through the Hollywood film 
industry to propagandize and shape U.S. democracy. 
1. China’s Aspirations of Becoming a Global Leader 
In 2017, Daniel R. Coats, Director of National Intelligence, stated in his Worldwide 
Threat Assessment that China’s primary objective is to continue to penetrate the decision-
making process in the United States.9 With President Xi Jinping having been reelected with 
no term limit, Kerry Brown, professor of Chinese studies at King’s College in London, 
believes Xi will be afforded the time to implement changes that “once seemed highly 
contentious.”10 
Michael Keane, an economist, said in 2011 that China still struggles with cultural 
exports.11 To overcome this deficit and balance China’s efforts, former President Hu Jintao 
first predicted potential political tensions due to China’s increased world power and 
suggested the use of culture to overcome these tensions. Hu suggested the general strength 
                                                 
9 Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, vol. 115th Cong. 1, 2017, 9, https://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/ SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf. 
10 Associated Press, “Chinese President Xi Jinping Re-Appointed with No Term Limits,” CBC, March 
16, 2018, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/chinese-president-xi-jinping-reappointed-no-term-limits-
1.4580962. 
11 Michael A. Keane, “Created in China: The New Catch up Strategy,” Proceedings International 
Communication Association, Development and Intercultural Communication Panel, Dresden, June 20, 
2006, 14, https://eprints.qut.edu.au/6200/1/6200_1.pdf. 
4 
of China’s culture and worldwide impact did not match its global status.12 Hu pointed out 
that the “West was strong in culture and China was ‘weak.’”13 Joseph Nye recognizes that 
the purpose of this strategy is to increase soft power and overcome China’s strength in 
strong power. He explains, “If a country can also increase its soft power of attraction, its 
neighbors feel less need to balance its power.”14 China’s increase in power is important 
for the United States to recognize. Understanding the goals and objectives of Chinese 
leaders will help U.S. leaders counteract or at least be aware of their investments. 
2. Soft Power and Sharp Power 
A conceptual and political understanding of soft power originates in 19th-century 
research by Hans J. Morgenthau, who described the elements of national power.15 Political 
scientists started to use the term in 1990, when Nye defined “soft power” as a nation’s 
ability to influence through means of political values, foreign policy, and culture.16 Not 
only did Nye pick up where Morgenthau and Knorr left off; he also coined the term. For 
this reason, Nye is known as the father of soft power and remains the leading authority on 
it.17  
While it seems natural to associate hard power with the military, soft power has 
been more difficult to define. Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you want 
                                                 
12 Peter Simpson, “Chinese President Hu Jintao Warns of Cultural Warfare from West,” Telegraph, 
January 2, 2012, sec. World, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8988195/Chinese-
President-Hu-Jintao-warns-of-cultural-warfare-from-West.html. 
13 Simpson. 
14 Joseph S. Nye, “China’s Soft Power Deficit,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2012, sec. Opinion, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304451104577389923098678842. 
15 Hans Joachim Morgenthau and Kenneth Winfred Thompson, Politics among Nations: The Struggle 
for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Random House, 1985), 5. 
16 Nye, Joseph S, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 
2016), 31. 
17 “Father of ‘Soft Power’ Tours the Region,” South China Morning Post, December 9, 2013. 
Proquest. 
5 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” 18 Nye further defines the resources 
of soft power as “the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.”19  
The notion of using culture to influence is not new. Niccolo Machiavelli in The 
Prince illustrates the complexity of a nation’s struggle to combine soft power approaches, 
which are harder to define than hard power approaches. Machiavelli asks, “Is it better to 
be loved more than feared, or feared more than loved?” He answers, “One ought to be both 
feared and loved, but as it is difficult for the two to go together, it is much safer to be feared 
than loved.”20 Along the same lines, Nye believes a combination of soft power and hard 
power is the difference between successful nations and ones that fall behind.21 In contrast, 
Joshua Kurlantzick, a Southeast Asia scholar, believes that the combination of economic 
power and soft power makes for successful nations.22 Kurlantzick argues China has a 
broader idea of soft power, using investment, aid, and formal diplomacy.23 China’s recent 
investments in Hollywood seem to support Kurlantzick’s claim.  
Nye argues countries with more hard power have an advantage because they can 
utilize their hard power status to influence “culture, politics and policies” within the realm 
of soft power to influence other countries to follow them.24 By co-opting people, rather 
than coercing them, soft power gently pushes other countries toward what the others 
want.25 Soft power is the opposite of hard power, whereby a preferred outcome is 
                                                 
18 Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics,” Foreign Affairs, 2004, 72, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2004-05-01/soft-power-means-success-world-
politics. 
19 Nye, 73. 
20 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, 2nd ed. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 61. 
21 Joseph S. Nye, “Limits of American Power,” Political Science Quarterly 131, no. 2 (June 1, 2016): 
267–268, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12478. 
22 Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Charm: Implications of Chinese Soft Power” (Policy paper, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 1, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/PB_47_FINAL.pdf. 
23 Kurlantzick, 1. 
24 Nye, “Limits of American Power,” 275. 
25 Nye, 276. 
6 
accomplished through force or military action and can come with negative consequences.26 
With the conventional belief and understanding that state power has focused on the hard 
power of the military, economic incentives, and coercion, Nye argues world leaders should 
not focus on hard power alone. He states that policymakers and observers need also to 
understand the second characteristic of U.S. power—soft power.27 By projecting soft 
power, a country can influence the decision-making of a foreign government and gain 
supporters around the world to follow its policies.28 Contrary to Nye, Elizabeth Economy, 
director of Asia studies at the U.S.-based Council on Foreign Relations, believes soft power 
is about “culture, education, and diplomacy,” not investments or growth of the economy.29 
Todd H. Hall agrees with Nye’s concept, which can be used in policy debates, but believes 
it may not be an efficient analytical tool.30 Hall suggests that separating soft power into 
parts helps clarify Nye’s mechanism for determining the intended effects of soft power. 
Hall states, “institutional power, reputational power and representational power” bring a 
thorough understanding of soft power.31 
Recently, the University of Southern California’s Center on Public Diplomacy 
ranked China 25 out of 30 in the global rankings of soft power. Jonathon McClory, the 
author of The Soft Power 30, believes China’s 525 government-funded and -staffed 
Confucius Institutes, on six different continents and 110 alone in the United States, are 
                                                 
26 Nye, 276. 
27 Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox, eds., Soft Power and U.S. Foreign Policy: Theoretical, 
Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (London: Routledge, 2010), 13. 
28 Nye, “Soft Power,” 275. 
29 Jia Chen and Qingfen Ding, “China’s Soft Power Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
accessed April 19, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinassoft-power-initiative. 
30 Todd Hall, “An Unclear Attraction: A Critical Examination of Soft Power as an Analytical 




paying dividends.32 Confucius Institutes provide students all around the world 
opportunities to study Chinese language, history, and arts at local college campuses, 
primarily in wealthy countries.33  
Keane finds that China’s leaders understand the importance of soft power, as they 
have recognized a cultural deficit caused by more goods being imported than exported.34 
“Soft power competition,” a term coined by Chua Beng Huat, a Singaporean scholar, refers 
to East Asia’s struggle for pop culture influence of exports to sway opinions of other 
countries. Chua’s addition to Nye’s definition of soft power has turned “into a regional 
index of pop culture.”35  
Sharp power is a fairly new concept by scholars who seek to differentiate between 
widespread cultural power and the specific targeted use of culture for foreign policy. 
Walker and Ludwig describe sharp power as “power that pierces, penetrates or perforates 
the political and informational environments in the targeted countries.”36 Walker and 
Ludwig argue that the billions of dollars China has spent on shaping public opinion through 
soft power is actually sharp power because the “authoritarian influence is not principally 
about attraction or even persuasion; instead, it centers on distraction and manipulation.”37  
3. The Importance of Media in a Democracy  
Early in U.S. history, French diplomat and historian Alexis de Tocqueville, best 
known for his work Democracy in America, studied the relationship between media and 
                                                 
32 Jonathan McClory, The Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power (Washington, DC: Portland 
Communications), 41–43, accessed January 25, 2018, https://softpower30.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/
07/The-Soft-Power-30-Report-2017-Web-1.pdf; “About Confucius Institute,” Hanban, accessed August 3, 
2018, http://english.hanban.org/node_10971.htm. 
33 McClory, The Soft Power 30, 41–43. 
34 Keane, “Created in China,” 13. 
35 Beng Huat Chua, Structure, Audience and Soft Power in East Asian Pop Culture (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2012). 
36 Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig, “The Meaning of Sharp Power,” Foreign Affairs, 
November 16, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power. 
37 Walker and Ludwig, “From ‘Soft Power’ to ‘Sharp Power.’” 
8 
democracy and pointed to the media’s important role as a tool for shaping public opinion.38 
Similarly, and in a more contemporary context, Shanto Iyengar provides a framework for 
studying the relationship between what the media and what society deems important.39 
Iyengar argues the public’s view is shaped by the media’s portrayal of events.40 For 
example, if a media source focuses on a particular topic over another, the public believes 
the one that receives more airtime is more significant. Iyengar’s agenda-setting framework 
focuses on the media’s ability to frame the news and also examines how the media can 
assign blame to some groups while offering its coverage as objective news.41 Combining 
media abilities gives media the power and responsibility in influencing democracies. James 
Curran in Media and Democracy refers to “soft news,” which is entertainment-based.42 
The influence of the media has led Curran to argue Americans are largely unaware of major 
issues within their society. Curran understands U.S. views are shaped by commercialized 
entertainment as opposed to fact-based news.43 This is an important aspect for this thesis 
as commercial Hollywood seeks new markets constantly and China presents such a market.  
Scholars such as Fenton also point to the importance of media in a democracy. In 
Protecting the News: Civil Society and the Media, Fenton notes that the independent news 
media aid the democratic process by assessing the sociopolitical environment while 
holding those in public service accountable.44 They are a voice for the people, providing 
information for the public to learn and become involved in society by expressing views 
through their platform. Fenton finds that regulatory control poses a problem whereby the 
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media are under a strict mechanism that sensationalizes stories, promotes “first to press” 
attitudes, and focuses on sales rather than the integrity of a story. Fenton believes the media 
have lost their purpose of serving the citizens and contributing to a working democracy, 
which has fueled the political disenchantment seen today.45 Hamilton agrees with Fenton 
regarding the media’s role in democracy and adds that U.S. journalists also realize they 
have a job to create income for their organizations.46 
Journalists are also motivated by expressing themselves in ways that may change 
the world, or at least have the opportunity to create an impact on society through their 
stories. The reality is that the media comprise a big market-driven business, which leads to 
the neglect of some important issues.47 China’s possible influence on the entertainment 
segment of the economy requires some research especially, as Anne-Marie Brady points 
out, on the important role propaganda has played in the Chinese political strategy.48 
The use of media for propaganda by China is not new. Lasswell, Martin, and 
Bernays note that Nazi Germany and other global powers such as the former U.S.S.R. 
deployed propaganda through radio and film to spread confusion. The United States has 
also used this technique with Radio Free Asia and Voices for America. These tools or 
techniques, combined with the spread of affordable television in the 1950s, provided new 
opportunities to influence the minds of viewers through modern-day media.49 Welch 
identifies a change in the definition of propaganda after World War II, when it became 
“deception or manipulation of human emotions through words and messages using half-
truths.”50 This change is the definition known today and used for this thesis. 
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Harold Lasswell comparably describes propaganda as “the control of opinion by 
significant symbols, or to speak more accurately by stories, rumors, reports, pictures, and 
other forms of social communication.”51According to Brady, who has examined China’s 
propaganda strategy in the past, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds the Central 
Propaganda Department (CPD) in high regard. Ding Guan’gen, director of the CPD from 
1992 to 2002, described the complexity of his work when he said, “Propaganda and thought 
work consists of many different threads, and it is a complicated task coordinating them 
all.”52 
Propaganda pioneer Edward Bernays defines propaganda as a “consistent, enduring 
effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the public to an enterprise, idea 
or group.”53 Bernays’s work shows that propaganda through media has also been an 
important part of the American strategy after World War I; it was used by the Committee 
on Public Information (CPI), which acted as a propaganda arm of the U.S. government. 
The CPI’s purpose was to ensure the American people supported the war and saw that U.S. 
involvement in the war was good for democracy.54 The CPI model of propaganda was the 
first to use all forms of media, including newspapers, telegraphs, movies, posters, and 
radio. CPI also had 75,000 men known as “four-minute men.”55 These volunteers attended 
social events in their communities and promoted the war by providing four-minute 
speeches, which happens to be the average attention span of most people.56 Common 
themes of the four-minute men were war bonds, rationing, and the draft.57 
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Lasswell suggests one of the lessons learned from World War I was that the war 
needed to be fought militarily, economically, and through the use of propaganda.58 The 
purpose of propaganda was to confuse the enemy.59 In contrast to Lasswell, Brady’s work 
has shown China’s propaganda is being used to influence the thoughts of the Chinese 
people toward the Communist agenda.60 At the same time, it counters the ideological 
beliefs of China’s enemies.61  
Scholars have found that news networks are increasingly moving toward 
infotainment, rather than objective reporting, in response to market incentives. The 
blending of news and entertainment blurs the line between the two types of content and as 
a result, audiences may attribute more weight—consciously or otherwise—to 
entertainment than they would if there were a clear break between fact and fiction in the 
media.  
Several scholars agree China’s posture suggests a desire for global standing. While 
the scholars do not agree on what constitutes soft power, they do agree that China uses soft 
power to insinuate itself into a position of influence within the United States and other 
countries. This literature review shows that media are an important communicative tool for 
any society. Their established role provides a preexisting conduit for propaganda. The 
literature also shows how propaganda may be used for influence and direction, including 
shaping a democracy. This review provides the framework for the research and analysis. 
The plethora of literature on China, soft power, media, and propaganda has not been fully 
explored here but was used in conducting this research. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses all open-source materials to explore the emerging threat of China’s 
attempts to shape public opinion through propaganda in Hollywood films. To that end, a 
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literature review provides context for China’s historical national security threat to the 
United States by depicting the competition between China and the United States since the 
Cold War era, by clarifying China’s global strategy, and by showing cases of state-
sponsored trade secret acquisitions adjudicated by the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Next, Chapter II examines China’s national security threat to the United States by 
looking at China’s use of soft and sharp power and economic influence in attempting to 
impact the content of Hollywood movies. This includes reviewing China’s recent 
investments and purchases in Hollywood as well as the effects of its strict limitations on 
U.S. films entering its own lucrative market. This thesis also considers the collateral 
influence China will have with other U.S. industries, such as the space sector, through 
Hollywood partnerships to produce big-budget films that require expertise and the use of 
equipment or other technology.  
Last, Chapter III considers Hollywood’s responsiveness to China by exploring the 
historical context of Hollywood and homeland security by offering examples of the U.S.–
China partnership in film and provides a review of coproduced and non-coproduced 
Hollywood movies—Gravity, Rogue One, Interstellar, Hidden Figures, The Martian, and 
Arrival. Space-themed films were chosen as China is highly interested in the space industry 
and in influencing opinion in this arena. The analysis of Chinese influence considered 
indicators such as main characters who represent China, locations filmed in China, visual 
imagery, and Asian martial arts and plot lines.  
The thesis concludes with three potential actions that can be undertaken to mitigate 
this threat, which are explicated in the recommendations. They include China’s removing 
the 34-film cap; conducting awareness outreach with U.S. audiences and decision-makers; 
and other government actions, such applying Foreign Agents Registrations Act (FARA) 
laws, which are currently being expanded to include acquisitions of U.S. media companies. 
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II. CHINA’S NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT TO THE UNITED 
STATES 
China is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its 
neighbors. 
—2018 National Defense Strategy Summary62 
 
A. U.S.–CHINESE SECURITY COMPETITION SINCE THE COLD WAR 
According to the Department of Defense, China’s current pace of economic and 
defense growth is a threat to United States’ position as a global leader.63 This chapter 
examines the competition that has emerged between the United States and China in the 
context of developments since the 1700s. It focuses on China’s global strategy toward 
gaining global power by acquiring trade secrets and how this has aided in shifting the 
balance of power. Finally, it discusses China’s tradecraft replication and the building of its 
own film industry due to China’s s realization of the media’s important communicative 
role in the public sphere and as a tool of soft power.  
Graham T. Allison, a Greek historian, coined the phrase “Thucydides trap” to 
describe when an established power’s fear of a rising power escalates toward war.64 Allison 
wrote: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which 
this caused in Sparta.”65 The “rising” power’s intent need not be nefarious, merely that the 
presence of a rising power inherently creates fear in the dominant power.66 The Thucydides 
trap is evident in current concerns about competition—and even fear of war—between the 
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United States and China. Despite a history of—at times admittedly uneasy—collaboration 
between the United States and China, a struggle for power is apparent and well 
documented. Power comes in many forms, and while the Thucydides trap is often invoked 
in discussions about hard-power conflict, it applies to competition involving non-military 
elements of national power, including economics (trade) and information (soft power).67  
The U.S. and Chinese tensions and interests did not begin with Hollywood. 
Bilateral relations became tense at the end of World War II in 1949, after Mao Zedong’s 
communists forced Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists to flee to Taiwan. Due to the rise of 
Soviet power, the United States was also wary of rising Communist China. U.S.–Chinese 
tensions grew in 1950 when the Korean War erupted, marking the beginning of the Cold 
War. After North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States and China engaged in a 
war, eventually ending with the United Nations armistice in 1953. Sino–U.S. tensions rose 
to a new level after China detonated its first nuclear weapon in 1964.68  
In 1972, President Nixon began to make efforts to rebuild the relationship, which 
continued through the Ford and Carter administrations. Sino–U.S. relations reached an 
apex in 1979 when Washington officially shifted its recognition of China from Taipei to 
Beijing.69 One of the benefits of this recognition was access to the Chinese markets and 
China opening up its economy, which assisted in its economic rise.  
Ten years later, the United States witnessed another side to China when, in 1989, 
liberal-leaning Chinese students from the middle class demonstrated in Tiananmen Square 
for democratic reform. The Tiananmen Square demonstrations were protests for political 
change throughout multiple cities over a three-week period that culminated with more than 
a million citizens descending on Tiananmen Square.70 Students called on the government 
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to hasten “political and economic reform, guarantee constitutional freedoms, fight 
corruption, adopt a press law, and allow the establishment of privately-run newspapers.”71  
Faced with increasing public pressure and miscommunication between government 
officials and protestors, Beijing was forced to handle the situation while the United States 
and the rest of the world watched.72 Zhao Ziyang was the General Secretary of the CCP 
during this time and was purged for refusing to agree with the use of force on students.73 
Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Central Military Commission at the time, sought to stop 
those assembled in the square through force.74 Deng’s leadership determined that the 
demonstrations were a counter-revolutionary riot, a characterization that falsely implied 
the demonstrators had taken up arms and had shed blood.75 The violent reaction of Deng’s 
troops to disperse the crowds led to the arrests or deaths of hundreds of protestors. China’s 
response against its own citizens shocked the United States and its allies and was, and has 
continued to be, the subject of largescale condemnation.76 The government’s violent 
reaction to the democratic political movement in Tiananmen Square illustrated Beijing’s 
need for total control over its people. Several decades later, with a subtler approach, Beijing 
now exercises complete censorship control.  
Despite the protest and response in Tiananmen Square, the United States could not 
ignore the economic opportunities presented by China, so the United States opened the 
door by actively incorporating Beijing into Western institutions, believing that it could 
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shape China in the process and also bring in their investments. Such Western integration 
culminated in China’s accession to the World Trade Organization.77  
In the decades following the protests, U.S.–Chinese trade has expanded 
significantly. For instance, 1992 brought $33 billion in bilateral trade between the United 
States and China.78 By 2017, the bilateral trade grew to more than $772 billion.79 China’s 
economic rise has shown rapid growth in a short period as proven with the measurement 
of the Gini coefficient.80 The Gini measurement calculated China’s income inequality in 
1987 at 0.3 and the last reading in 2012 at 42.2.81 The metric illustrates that income 
distribution among the Chinese has grown as a result of an economic rise and trade with 
the United States and other countries. China’s growth equates to more buying power that 
may offset the relationship with the United States, especially as China uses that buying 
power to continue to strengthen its military.  
However, the established pattern of trade is primed for disruption by the United 
States’ imposition of economic penalties on China. The bilateral relationship is likely to 
become more fraught due to the two countries’ diverging foreign policy objectives on 
topics including nuclear power by Iran, Syria, and North Korea, which China supports.82 
Moreover, the United States and China do not agree on human rights issues and maintain 
differing positions about the legitimacy of China’s single-party governance.83 Sanctions 
                                                 
77 Young, 658. 
78 “U.S. Relations with China,” Department of State, August 22, 2018, https://www.state.gov/u-s-
relations-with-china/. 
79 Department of State. 
80 Will Kenton, “Gini Index,” Investopedia, February 6, 2019, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/
gini-index.asp. 
81 “GINI Index,” World Bank, accessed August 22, 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SI.POV.GINI?locations=CN. 
82 Tom O’Connor, “Are North Korea and Syria Working Together against U.S. Foreign Policy?,” 
Newsweek, February 27, 2018, https://www.newsweek.com/are-north-korea-syria-working-together-
against-us-822564. 
83 “Did the Tiananmen Square Protests Lead to More Democracy in China?,” Martens Centre, 
accessed July 30, 2018, https://www.martenscentre.eu/blog/did-tiananmen-square-protests-lead-more-
democracy-china. 
17 
were not the first sign of trouble—under the Obama administration there was a high-profile 
indictment of PLA figures for cyber espionage.84  
In the last two decades, Beijing has greatly decreased its military gap with the 
United States by increasing its defense budgets, stealing technology, and acquiring a 
Russia-built aircraft carrier.85 This increase in hard power makes China a global threat to 
the U.S.-led world. Precisely because of its hard-power advancement in the past decade, 
China may now also engage in a soft-power strategy directed at decreasing international 
concern about its activities and intentions. To balance power, China may increase trade 
with the United States to show a willingness to cooperate and expand its economy. In the 
two charts below, titled U.S. Trade in Goods with China, 1989, and U.S. Trade in Goods 
with China, 2017, Tables 1 and 2 show a substantial increase in U.S. and Chinese imports 
and exports from 1989 to 2017. At the end of 1989—the year of Tiananmen Square—
Chinese trade with the United States was $5.7 million for exports and $11.9 million in 
imports (Table 1).86 By the end of 2017, Chinese trade was $129.8 million for exports and 
$505.4 million in imports (Table 2).87  
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Table 1. U.S. Trade in Goods with China, 198988 
Month Exports Imports Balance 
January 1989 439.0 788.9 -349.9 
February 1989 464.7 798.1 -333.4 
March 1989 565.4 667.3 -101.9 
April 1989 415.3 728.5 -313.2 
May 1989 482.4 937.9 -455.5 
June 1989 362.7 1,021.7 -659.0 
July 1989 637.7 1,162.7 -525.0 
August 1989 688.5 1,279.6 -591.1 
September 1989 427.9 1,179.3 -751.4 
October 1989 542.4 1,340.4 -798.0 
November 1989 305.0 1,133.8 -828.8 
December 1989 424.4 951.5 -527.1 
TOTAL 1989 5,755.4 11,989.7 -6,234.3 
NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted 
unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding. The table reflects only 
those months for which there was trade. 
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Table 2. U.S. Trade in Goods with China, 201789 
Month Exports Imports Balance 
January 2017 9,961.1 41,343.1 -31,382.0 
February 2017 9,735.8 32,804.3 -23,068.5 
March 2017 9,719.2 34,186.9 -24,467.8 
April 2017 9,805.7 37,465.6 -27,660.0 
May 2017 9,862.2 41,783.1 -31,920.9 
June 2017 9,717.4 42,289.2 -32,571.7 
July 2017 9,979.1 43,589.2 -33,610.1 
August 2017 10,828.3 45,817.8 -34,989.4 
September 2017 10,911.7 45,429.7 -34,518.0 
October 2017 12,963.4 48,167.7 -35,204.2 
November 2017 12,765.0 48,127.8 -35,362.8 
December 2017 13,644.8 44,465.7 -30,820.9 
TOTAL 2017 129,893.6 505,470.0 -375,576.4 
NOTE: All figures are in millions of U.S. dollars on a nominal basis, not seasonally adjusted 
unless otherwise specified. Details may not equal totals due to rounding. The table reflects only 
those months for which there was trade. 
 
China could potentially lose a significant amount of money if there are increased 
tensions with the United States and possibly engages in counterbalancing with soft power 
in order to maximize its strategic advantage. Its activities in Hollywood could be an 
aspect of this balancing act. 
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B. CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL GLOBAL STRATEGY 
The Chinese government is implementing a comprehensive, long-term 
industrial strategy to ensure its global dominance.… Beijing’s ultimate goal 
is for domestic companies to replace foreign companies as designers and 
manufacturers of key technology and products first at home, then abroad.  
 —U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission90 
 
In China, the state is the most important actor; it aids in the competition against 
other countries by strengthening Chinese companies. China’s global strategy was outlined 
during the National People’s Congress in March 2016 when the state revealed its 13th five-
year plan (2016–2020), The plan includes executing a long-term industrial strategy in 
which Chinese companies replace foreign companies throughout China and abroad.91 With 
the backing of their government, Chinese companies have an edge over foreign competitors 
who desire access to China’s lucrative market. In addition, Chinese companies expand 
globally while being backed by their powerful state. While the United States does this as 
well, the U.S. free-market model necessitates that the state plays a smaller role. As a result, 
foreign competitors in China find it difficult to compete in a market that is directed by the 
state in favor of Chinese companies; they also have to compete at the global level against 
Chinese companies with powerful Chinese backing. 
While China’s industrial strategy is mainly directed at domestic developments, 
Beijing also leverages its access to less restrictive markets and more open creative 
environments in the United States and other countries. For example, China is capitalizing 
on access to external universities, investments in companies, and goods and services.92 
Such moves are examples of its expanding soft power strategy, which extends to 
Hollywood, and is discussed in Chapter III.  
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1. China and State-Sponsored Trade Secret Acquisitions 
According to scholars such as Ann-Marie Brady and David Shambaugh, China is 
notorious for state-sponsored trade-secret acquisitions in the form of economic espionage 
and theft of trade secrets, which allow Beijing to leapfrog technological advancements.93 
The Department of Defense’s 2018 National Defense Strategy also states that “China is a 
strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors.”94 These 
predatory economics have been highlighted in the Department of Justice’s case files from 
2008–2011, where over 90 percent of their economic espionage cases attributed to benefit 
China were state-led.95  
An example of Beijing’s willingness to engage in clandestine intelligence activities 
directed at undermining U.S. military capabilities is evident in the case of Greg Dongfan 
Chung (Chung). From the early 1970s through 2004, Beijing illegally operated Chung, a 
spy in Long Beach, California, who sent over 200,000 classified documents on NASA’s 
space program to China.96 With the sole intent of spying on America, Chung, a Chinese 
native, moved to the United States in 1972 and later became the leading engineer on the 
space shuttle.97 In 2009, Chung was convicted of economic espionage for stealing U.S. 
trade secrets from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman, resulting in billions 
of dollars of lost revenue for the U.S. economy.98  
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It was not long ago that Chi Mak, a Chinese spy, was arrested for helping China 
increase its naval technology.99 Mak admitted that he was sent to the United States in 1978 
in order to obtain employment in the defense industry with the goal of stealing U.S. defense 
secrets, which he did for 20-plus years. He most recently passed information on quiet 
electric propulsion systems for the next generation of U.S. submarines, details on the Aegis 
radar system, and information on stealth ships being developed by the U.S. Navy.100  
Mak also provided China a document that discussed solid-state power switches for 
mission-critical power systems onboard Navy ships.101  
The Chinese government tasked Mak to acquire information on other specific 
technologies. Mak recruited family members to encrypt and covertly courier information 
back to China. In May 2007, Chi Mak was convicted of conspiracy, attempting to violate 
export control laws, failing to register as an agent of a foreign government, and making 
false statements to investigators. He was sentenced to more than 24 years in prison and 
four members of his family received varying sentences of up to 10 years in prison.102  
In the commercial sector, Brett Kingstone developed an emerging technology of 
fiber optic lighting systems and components while he was at Stanford University in 
1981.103 After having shaped his company Super Vision into a multimillion-dollar 
company, Chinese counterfeiters stole his designs.104 Samson Wu, a Chinese thief, 
convinced one of Kingstone’s employees to divulge the proprietary technology in exchange 
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for more than $1 million.105 After years of litigation, Kingstone won a $33 million 
judgment against Wu, who has yet to pay.106 Peter Navarro, who currently serves as the 
Assistant to the President, Director of Trade and Industrial Policy and the Director of the 
White House National Trade Council, stated:  
It’s not just that China cheats and steals our intellectual property. They’re 
also coming with large bags full of money to basically buy up the crown 
jewels of American technology. And the biggest picture here is China has 
this thing called China 2025. It’s a policy manifesto which says that they 
want to take over all of the emerging industries of the future, artificial 
intelligence, robotics, quantum computing, these things.107 
China’s recent purchases and theft of trade secrets may assist them in the power 
shift they desire. 
In another example, two Chinese citizens pled guilty in 2013 for attempting to steal 
U.S. trade secrets. Ji Li Huang and Xiao Guang Qi represented Ningbo Oriental Crafts 
Limited, which manufactured products for export to the United States and Europe. Huang 
and Guang targeted Pittsburgh Corning, a leading manufacturer of cellular glass insulation 
used to “insulate buildings, industrial piping systems, and liquefied natural gas storage tank 
bases.”108 In brazen attempts to obtain Pittsburgh Corning’s proprietary trade secrets, 
Huang and Guang broke into the company, took pictures of the plant, and tried to pay an 
employee $100,000 for insider knowledge of plant operations and research and 
development.109 During the trial, the court ruled the potential loss to Pittsburgh Corning, 
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based on investment, research and development, time, and research, was over $7 
million.110  
In 2015, Xiwen Huang, a Chinese businessman living in Charlotte, North Carolina, 
was charged with theft of trade secrets after he was caught with classified information he 
illegally obtained from several companies for which he had worked.111 Huang came to the 
United States with the sole intent to steal.112 He had obtained his doctorate in chemical 
engineering from Auburn University and became a naturalized U.S. citizen.113 By 2014, 
Huang had obtained intelligence on U.S. military vehicle fuel cells—more than 500 
documents containing trade secrets related to 30 different products worth more than $65 
million and more than 100 documents containing trade secrets worth more than $25 
million.114 Court records revealed Huang had returned to China before he was arrested and 
had recorded his 16-year accomplishment in a document he entitled “Trip of Dream 
Realization.”115 In this document, Huang describes his commitment to China:  
Throughout these 16 years, I always have a dream of returning to China to 
develop my ambition. In order to realize this dream, I have worked in U.S. 
national research academies [laboratories], largest chemical companies in 
the world. I have also worked in small companies in the US. My goal was 
to learn, digest, accumulate, and make preparations for realizing the dream. 
… Consequently, I started scheming, planning that last for close to 2 years, 
and returned to China formally in this year, and initiated my own “Trip of 
Dream Realization.” ... As the main thrust during the country’s 
development, it is necessary and obligatory for our generation to fulfill our 
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share of responsibility in contributing towards the societal progress of 
China.116  
Huang was arrested upon his return to the United States and pleaded guilty to charges of 
corporate espionage. 
Chinese companies have demonstrated their willingness to illegally steal desired 
technology for the benefit of China. For instance, in July 2018, the Department of Justice 
announced that Chinese company Sinovel was guilty of stealing source code for software 
that powered wind turbines. A federal judge ordered the Chinese company to pay $59 
million to the U.S. company from which it had stolen.117 In another example, Mo Hailong, 
the director of the Beijing Dabeinong Technology Group, which specializes in corn seed, 
was sentenced in 2016 to three years in prison for the theft of inbred corn seeds.118
 
Hailong 
admitted to stealing the seeds that were already planted in an Iowa cornfield and attempted 
to return them to China to replicate the valuable trade secrets from U.S. companies Dupont 
Pioneer and Monsanto.119 While these Chinese companies do not appear to be tasked 
directly by Beijing, such acts of espionage undermine U.S. economic security by 
capitalizing on investments in U.S. research and development and benefit China in 
economic growth.120 The United States has experienced Chinese theft from military, 
private technology companies, and agriculture. Based on a statement in the China 2025 
manifesto, the United States can expect that similar emerging technologies and capabilities 
of interest will become targets.121  
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A critical problem is that Americans are likely not aware of China’s continued 
targeting of the United States because these issues are either not discussed in the media or 
not extensively discussed. Public communication is an important space for shaping 
audience perceptions of China. This is particularly important because perception shapes 
policy in a democracy like America, which relies on the public to prioritize policy 
decisions.  
Hollywood and the American media sector, therefore, present an opportunity for 
China to expand its soft power through its acquisitions in the film industry and 
requirements for entry into its markets. Targeting Hollywood is not merely about 
entertainment but also contains messages about issues surrounding the defense and 
commercial sector. China can leverage Hollywood’s presence in the civilian sector to exert 
soft power, which has the potential to impact U.S. strategic interests, political will, and the 
economy.  
2. Shifting Power Balance through Soft Power 
China’s commitment to establishing platforms for exerting soft power is 
increasingly becoming apparent across the world. One of the most prominent of such 
institutions is the Confucius Institute, which is linked to the Ministry of Education of the 
People’s Republic of China. The Confucius Institute represents soft power for China 
through promoting Chinese language and culture on college campuses, some members of 
the U.S. Congress have mobilized against them by combining efforts. On April 5, 2018, 
Texas Congressmen Michael McCaul (R-TX) and Henry Cuellar (D-TX), directed a 
bipartisan investigation into the threat of Confucius Institutes in their state. Letters were 
sent to all Texas universities hosting the institutes, stating, “We strongly urge these 
universities to consider terminating their partnerships with Confucius Institutes and other 
Chinese government supported organizations.”122 In his testimony to the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, FBI Director Christopher Wray stated that Confucius Institutes 
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are “exploiting the very open research and development environment we have, which we 
all revere, but they’re taking advantage of it.”123  
A bipartisan approach to stave off Confucius Institutes’ influence on U.S. campuses 
culminated in President Trump signing legislation to prevent expansion of Chinese 
language programs and their funding by the Pentagon. The National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2019 specifically bars universities from mixing Pentagon funds with 
those of the Communist Party.124 This action came after it was discovered that Arizona 
University was using both sources to teach Mandarin.125 Understandably, universities 
want their students to learn languages—especially Mandarin—from subject-matter 
experts. U.S. students learning Mandarin could benefit the United States in future business, 
trade negotiations, and cultural understanding. However, using funds that have been set 
aside to protect the United States did not appear to be a judicial way to spend the money. 
Nevertheless, with the new act in place, combining U.S. government funds and Confucius 
Institutes is now illegal. The National Defense Act for Fiscal Year 2019 shows the United 
States is cognizant of how China’s Confucius Institutes can influence soft power to our 
military. 
Similar to its campaign in the U.S. entertainment industry, China is making gains 
in countries like New Zealand through direct investments in its media. New Zealand 
provides an example of what the United States may face. Recently, Clive Hamilton, a 
lecturer of public ethics at Charles Sturt University in Australia and author of Silent 
Invasion, said, “China plans to dominate the world, and has been using Australia and New 
Zealand as a testing ground for its tactics to assert its ascendancy in the West.”126  
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China’s investment in U.S. media needs more U.S. government attention. As in the 
case of the Confucius Institute, China can access U.S. audiences through the media and try 
to influence the public sphere.  
3. Tradecraft Replication: Building Its Own Media Capability through 
Acquisition 
Like the United States, China successfully uses foreign investment and cultural 
exchange programs to further its interests and increase its soft power. China’s recent 
purchases and investments in the high-tech and media sectors have alarmed some analysts 
because Beijing is involved in some private Chinese companies investing in the United 
States. Such integration allows China to influence the U.S. economy because China, being 
a state-led economy, benefits directly through any economic gain, unlike in a market-
capitalist democracy that relies on secondary mechanisms such as taxes.127 These 
investments have a place within China’s broader sharp power apparatus. Chinese 
investment may allow it to influence decisions through pressure and the threat of 
divestment.128  
China’s recent purchases in the entertainment industry are examples of its strategy 
to influence Hollywood and soften its image. In July 2018, Chinese company Dalian 
Wanda, one of the world’s largest media empires owned by Wang Jianlin, formed a 
partnership with Sony Pictures Entertainment, an American entertainment company. Wang 
Jianlin has self-proclaimed ties to the Chinese government that provides him with Beijing’s 
support.129 The purchase of partnership with Sony Pictures represents a large investment 
in Hollywood, as Sony is one of the “big six” companies considered the voices of the film 
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industry.130 With this purchase, Dalian Wanda,  can now participate and influence other 
members of the big six group—Walt Disney Studios, Paramount Pictures, Twentieth 
Century Fox, Universal Pictures, and Warner Bros—through playing in the same national 
field.131 The company has attempted to make headway into Hollywood by controlling both 
production and distribution assets, a vertical and horizontal integration that allows them 
reach to U.S. audiences and control what they see. By purchasing Sony Pictures, Dalian 
Wanda set itself up for a larger share and greater control of the film market. In 2016, it 
purchased one of Hollywood’s largest production companies, Legendary Entertainment, 
for a reported $3.5 billion, and AMC Theaters for $2.6 billion in 2012.132  
Some members of Congress are concerned that such recent investments expand 
pro-Chinese propaganda opportunities into the United States. In a 2016 letter, 16 members 
of Congress requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and 
produce a report on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), 
an interagency committee charged with assisting the president in ensuring national security 
in foreign economic transactions.133 The letter requested that the GAO determine whether 
the committee has kept up with the “growing scope of foreign acquisitions in strategically 
important sectors in the United States.”134 The specific concern cited media acquisitions 
that “may pose a strategic rather than overt national security threat.”135  
In 2012, the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission released 
details on Chinese investments resulting in “potential economic distortions and national 
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security concerns...from China’s system of state-supported and state-led economic 
growth.”136 The commission recommended that CFIUS block acquisitions, takeovers, or 
mergers involving Chinese telecom companies Huawei and ZTE, given the threat to U.S. 
national security interests.137 The recent presidential-CFIUS blocking of Chinese company 
Huawei buying Qualcomm Inc. for $117 billion stopped what would have been the largest 
acquisition in the history of technology.138 Such actions show the importance of protecting 
national assets is well recognized by the U.S. government. 
Protecting national interests in the film industry appears to be important to China 
too. Beijing established the CPD to protect what is produced or viewed in China.139 While 
the CPD is accepted in China, U.S. government protection in Hollywood may be met with 
resistance by U.S. citizens who are not as familiar with government control.  
Beijing’s ability to influence the market is also higher due to lack of private 
monitoring institutions. The lack of a private film rating system in China allows the state 
to decided which films will be shown in the country. China’s films get approved by 
Beijing’s State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television 
(SAPPRFT), which generally ensures that films are acceptable for all audiences and 
Beijing’s government. As a result of this censorship, the Chinese film industry has 
traditionally relied on the strength of culture and on prominent actors to overcome weak 
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storylines and limited special effects.140 Chinese filmmakers tend to use predictable 
formats that are profitable for their investors. With a desire to be improve, China looks at 
the United States to learn the formula for blockbuster films, acquire technical expertise, 
and ultimately become a competitor to the U.S. industry. By creating blockbuster-type 
movies, China can drive content both internally and externally, and to the world. China’s 
push to enhance its capabilities are partly to maintain the interest of Chinese audiences but 
another goal is to use its investment to reach American audiences too.  
The 2017 Chinese film Wolf Warrior 2, produced by Wu Jing, a martial arts expert, 
is an example of China’s rapid learning curve in producing blockbuster films. With a focus 
on action scenes, stunts, and a SAPPRFT-approved pro-China messaging of a rising 
military, the film “smashed cinema records.”141 With the production of Wolf Warrior 2, 
China may no longer need Hollywood to produce content for its propaganda and market. 
While China and Hollywood may continue making films together, each collaborative effort 
allows China to build a film empire by creating a Hollywood with Chinese preferences.  
As China continues to build its film industry, it is logical to believe they will also 
continue the pattern of illicit collection to duplicate Hollywood’s success, much like they 
do with U.S. proprietary and military information. This tactic can enhance their access to 
U.S. and global audiences to employ soft power.  
Hollywood films carry messages that shape the public sphere and influence U.S. 
political developments. These films are ostensibly intended as entertainment and justified 
not by ideology but by the studios’ financial bottom line and includes the Chinese market. 
To make it into that market, Hollywood must abide by Chinese rather than U.S. norms. It 
does so by portraying China in a positive light in the same sort of self-censorship that 
occurs in China.  
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China’s investment in Hollywood can be seen as a variation of information warfare. 
For example, there are indications that China is using its position, market, and investment 
in Hollywood to influence the American public. Through it, Beijing can rely on not only 
economic espionage but also propaganda to assert dominance. China’s accrual of soft and 
sharp power is not a result of military power; it complements it by offsetting China’s image 
as an aggressor. These examples highlight the dangers of Chinese involvement in media 
that both normalizes China’s behavior and fosters complacency among the U.S. audiences 
unaware of the underlying dynamics. 
Films are a catalyst for ideas and opinions. Both propaganda and product placement 
continue in films and are similar in many ways. Both can be subtle yet have a profound 
effect on the viewer. For instance, the U.S. commercial sector has utilized Hollywood films 
to showcase companies and products such as McDonald’s and Apple or Nike apparel. 
Other product placement examples include Ray-Ban sunglasses in Risky Business (1983) 
and Top Gun (1986) as well as Reese’s Pieces in ET (1982). Audiences cannot easily tune 
out these subliminal advertisements in movies; product placement frames the viewers’ 
perceptions of the latest trends in fashion and other areas, which may in turn drive 
commercial sales.  
The historical partnership between the U.S. military and Hollywood has been 
beneficial and, for the most part, portrayed the U.S. government in a positive light. For 
instance, popular films such as the Contact (1997), Hurt Locker (2008), and Pearl Harbor 
(2001) are patriotic and illustrate the importance of the industry for the state. 
Hollywood’s recent attempt to enter the Chinese market gives Beijing access to the 
American audience, historically a communicative space used by the U.S. government and 
civil society. Gordon Allport’s parasocial contact theory provides a framework for 
understanding the process that could soften the American public’s stance toward China. 
The theory suggests that spending more time with a person whose background is different 
from one’s own identity (i.e., a member of the “out-group”) in interpersonal interactions 
can significantly reduce the level of prejudice toward other members of the out-group. 
Allport describes how parasocial contact might be achieved by watching films, which 
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provide opportunities to identify personally with the plot or actors and, ultimately, break 
down barriers or prejudices.  
The study of China’s market and the analysis of Hollywood’s responsiveness to 
China informs an understanding of themes propagated through Hollywood films. The next 
chapter examines the implications of media as a vector for propaganda and its significance 
to homeland security as well as answers the question of how China’s influence in 
Hollywood threatens national security. 
4. Homeland Security, Hollywood, and U.S. Military Propaganda 
Hollywood’s elite and the state have influenced the American public since film’s 
Golden Age in the 1920s. Hollywood’s ability to influence through film has aided in the 
election of U.S. presidents and steered millions of followers.142 However, this relationship 
is not unidirectional. The U.S. government has had a strong influence in Hollywood since 
1927. For example, in war films, the producers needed the U.S. military to provide heavy 
equipment such as tanks and airplanes to show realism in war.143 The partnership between 
Hollywood and the military kept costs down and helped bring authenticity in U.S. military-
themed films such as Patton (1970), A Few Good Men (1992), Saving Private Ryan (1998), 
and the Captain America series (2011-2016). Such cost-saving productions require 
cooperation from the military and, therefore, approval. It is reasonable to believe that if 
films portrayed the United States in a negative light, the U.S. military would refuse to 
cooperate. Currently, the U.S. military can negotiate terms with Hollywood for use of their 
heavy equipment; however, with the advancement of digital film, it is possible filmmakers 
could replace the heavy equipment needed to replicate realism with computer-generated 
images, putting the power back into the hands of Hollywood. Although Hollywood is 
increasingly able to circumvent the need for military assistance, the relationship has 
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arguably conditioned filmmakers to account not only for audiences but also for 
bureaucratic gatekeepers.  
The Chinese government is a gatekeeper and utilizes its power to influence the 
public as Hollywood expands into the Asian market. Portrayals of China as a good global 
citizen in the field of science and technology can contribute to Beijing’s acceptance as a 
cooperative international partner. However, by building up China’s image in films, 
Hollywood may be the drawbridge that welcomes the Chinese Trojan horse. Cooperation 
between China and Hollywood brings with it opportunities for Chinese propaganda. Such 
practices frame perceptions about China and its objectives, which over time may result in 
harm to U.S. interests. Allowing China to use Hollywood as a vehicle for propaganda to 
bolster its reputation as a leader in industries, such as space, is a homeland security issue 
because it leverages domestic U.S. assets to advance a foreign adversary’s objectives. 
While there are many examples of Chinese influence, this thesis explores six space-themed 
films and analyzed them to illustrate the expansion of China’s soft power.  
Advances in media make it possible to reach ever-larger audiences, and many 
countries have capitalized on them to influence others. Parasocial contact theory can be 
applied to Hollywood in examining the industry’s ability to overcome social, cultural, and 
racial barriers, as demonstrated by films on such issues. Hollywood broke down barriers 
by including African American actors such as Sidney Poitier, Harry Belafonte, and 
Dorothy Dandridge in roles central to films, which brought about societal acceptance 
through parasocial contact with the audience.144 Since the 1960s, the roles and 
opportunities for African Americans have continued to grow in Hollywood and have set a 
precedent for other groups that may also be struggling to become part of Hollywood—and 
American society. Today, it is not unusual to have plot lines that deal with previously 
controversial or even controversial topics such as homosexuality, politics, or gun control. 
Hollywood has been a major driver of social movements toward acceptance of several 
issues by promoting parasocial contact. 
                                                 




Hollywood’s ability to generate soft power through entertainment—which can be 
used to promote specific social values, showcase belief systems, shape narratives, and 
advocate change—is quite extensive given its large audience. The United States is not the 
only country to leverage the power of motion pictures. Germany’s Leni Riefenstahl, a Nazi 
sympathizer, directed several innovative German propaganda films in the 1930s and 
received recognition for her use of positive imagery and employment of novel techniques 
for music, lenses, and aerial photography.145 Riefenstahl lionized Nazi pageantry and was 
known as Hitler’s favorite filmmaker.146 She created films commissioned by Hitler during 
anti-Semitic campaigns to demonstrate “a monolithic Nazi party.”147 Although Riefenstahl 
was not a member of the Nazi party, her soft-power films with enhanced techniques of 
rhythmic montages influenced many to believe in Hitler’s plan.148 The Riefenstahl 
example highlights how film can be used to further sharp power and how parasocial 
contact—in this case, with the Nazi party—can influence perception.  
Through film, viewers may gain a better understanding of politics and leadership 
as well as their own significance in the world. An example is the film Mr. Smith Goes to 
Washington (1939), in which American politics are portrayed as corrupt. The hero of the 
film, Jefferson Smith, played by James Stewart, is appointed to a U.S. Senate seat and seeks 
to provide land for a national boys’ camp, despite his boss already having sanctioned the 
land for a fraudulent scheme.149 In a filibuster, Smith is able to turn the tables on his boss 
through his folksy charisma and commitment to doing the right thing—the scene earned 
Stewart an Academy Award. This scene inspired Margaret Chase Smith to run for—and 
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win—a congressional seat representing a district in Maine.150 The filibuster scene has 
possibly inspired generations of congressmen and (and their constituents) to believe in the 
power of one person to stand up to the status quo. Mr. Smith Goes to Washington continues 
to be an important reference in U.S. popular culture as it has been cited in over 175 films 
and television shows, and in June 2006, the American Film Institute ranked the film as fifth 
out of the 100 most inspiring films of all time.151 
Senator Arlen Spector highlighted the powerful influence Hollywood has on public 
perceptions in his assessment that “when Hollywood speaks, the world listens; when 
Washington speaks, the world snoozes.”152 If films can play such an important role in U.S. 
culture, films that show China as a positive force could arguably benefit China due to the 
power of parasocial contact. China is set to dominate the global box offices by 2020, thanks 
to its large market and investments in the entertainment industry.153 With control of the 
market, Beijing can continue to accrue and/or control soft power influence in Hollywood 
as production companies boost pro-China propaganda for access to the Chinese market.  
In addition, China’s influence of content and distribution in Hollywood may 
provide opportunities for shaping public opinion, which provides the context and drivers 
for policymaking. China’s recent implementation of Xi’s five-year plan by making inroads 
to the U.S. media industry is one such example.154  China’s strategy to accomplish this 
includes the use of both direct investments in the film industry and the promise of its 
markets.155 By dangling a lucrative market in front of U.S. entertainment executives, China 
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has endeavored to steer Hollywood into self-censorship and content production consistent 
with Beijing’s interests. The massive Chinese market is currently predicted to be the largest 
in the world by 2020.156 China has projected a box office earnings target of $8.36 billion 
in sales that provides China with the significant clout in the entertainment field. Academics 
have started to take notice of China’s increasing influence in Hollywood. China’s pursuit 
of global power through its economic policy has unique and alarming implications for 
Hollywood, as Beijing turns an industry that has traditionally served as a powerful source 
of propaganda and strategic communication toward the purpose of promoting itself and 
possibly countering U.S. interests.157 
5. Hollywood and the Importance of China’s Market 
The Chinese film market is one of the most closed in the world.158 The government 
restricts the number of foreign films through censorship and prohibits external investments. 
Such policies put pressure on and influence Hollywood films.159 For example, China 
currently allows 34 U.S. films a year to be shown there. To get selected, Hollywood studios 
must submit to SAPPRFT’s stringent approval process. Hollywood writers, producers, and 
film companies sometimes have to alter scripts and scenes if they want to enter China’s 
film market.160 When Hollywood refuses to comply with China’s demands, it risks losing 
the opportunity to show films in China.  
As an example, some analysts point to the film Captain Phillips, which did not 
make the Chinese market because it depicted a U.S. Navy SEAL team going out of its way 
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to save one person.161 This U.S. military action, to save one person, did not reflect China’s 
“collectivism” or “low individualism” views and, therefore, did not receive SAPPRFT 
support.162 The film fell $9 million short of its expected earnings.163 Even if it had shown 
in China, Hollywood only receives 25 percent of the film sales from China while other 
countries receive up to 50 percent.164 The stiff competition creates an incentive for 
Hollywood to compete with the rest of the world to produce content acceptable to China in 
order to earn one of the 34 film slots. 
SAPPRFT’s requirement that China be shown in a positive light may be a reason 
why China is seldom depicted as a threat in big-budget films. An example of the 
consequences for doing so is Seven Years in Tibet (1997). Not accepted by SAPPRFT for 
the Chinese market, the film shows China’s invasion of Tibet, which has drawn significant 
negative attention to China for humanitarian issues inherent in its policy toward Tibet.165 
In the film, Beijing detains and prosecutes activists and human rights attorneys and 
introduces new laws that label activists and criticism as state security threats.166 
In 2008, MGM studios spent over $1 million reworking the 1984 film Red Dawn, 
which originally portrayed a Soviet attack on the United States. The new version was 
written to portray China—a plausible enemy—as an aggressor.167 During production, 
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however, the producers changed several scenes, digitally edited insignia on patches, and 
ultimately replaced China with another in hopes of showing the film in the Chinese 
market.168 While the 2012 version of Red Dawn was ultimately not selected by SAPPRFT, 
if MGM had not changed the antagonist, they feared that China might have banned future 
MGM films, as it did with Brad Pitt’s films after he starred in Seven Years in Tibet. This 
type of punishment to actors and studios may show how far China will go to protect itself 
from outside opinions and influence others to follow its viewpoint if they want into China’s 
market.  
SAPPRFT also tries to influence films outside of China, which may not be 
favorable for the country. One example of a boycott was the film Dunkirk (2017), which 
portrayed China’s core values negatively. An aspect of the film that produced criticism in 
China was the glorification of General Sir Harold Alexander, who is said to have caused 
the death of thousands of Chinese soldiers. Another film that has drawn much attention in 
China is Marc Forester’s live-action Christopher Robin (2018), which is an adaptation of 
the children’s book Winnie the Pooh. The banning of this film in China, some believe, is 
due to the link between the main character, a “honey-loving plump bear” named Winnie 
the Pooh, to Chinese President Xi Jinping.169 The comparison link was promoted in social 
media circles and upset Xi to the point that Beijing has cracked down on people in China 
who send memes of the president and Winnie the Pooh.170 These recent bans illustrate the 
depths of Beijing’s control and influence on its people abilities to watch what they want. 
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III. HOLLYWOOD’S RESPONSIVENESS TO CHINA 
The Chinese state also seeks to expand its influence externally through its economic 
prowess and by the use of its markets. Hollywood is no stranger to oversight and control 
as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) advocates policies to protect 
creative content and provide a film-rating system recognized by Hollywood and around the 
world.171 Before the creation of the MPAA, studios adhered to the Production Code for 
decades as a rubric for determining acceptable content. Culturally, then, filmmakers—
although they often advocate for freedom of expression and First Amendment rights—are 
primed to adhere to external standards to make their product acceptable and, at the same 
time, profitable. By having a lucrative market and creating rules that only benefit the state, 
China ensures its ability to shape the narrative and takes advantage of this predisposition, 
which will cause Hollywood to react in order to benefit lucratively. This chapter covers 
Hollywood’s responsiveness to China and its markets and it presents key findings from an 
analysis of six space-themed films that came out in Hollywood in recent years. Identifying 
these particular themes can help understand propaganda in Hollywood films that may 
inadvertently support China’s soft power strategies. 
Beijing often implements government regulations and invests to further its soft-
power strategies. The film market is one area Beijing is able to push soft power, which has 
become problematic for the United States because Hollywood, seeking new markets, 
appears to comply with the demands of SAPPRFT in the hopes of getting approval to show 
films in China. This pro-market behavior affords China leverage over content in U.S. films, 
which are also viewed by the U.S. market and, therefore, can influence and shape U.S. 
democracy.  
To gain a portion of China’s $180-billion market, Hollywood continues to seek 
SAPPRFT’s approval. For instance, Disney’s Iron Man 3 (2013), seeking to be one of the 
34 films to be distributed in China, included more shots of Beijing and gave a starring role 
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to one of China’s well-known actresses, Fan Bingbing.172 Disney, which coproduced the 
film along with Marvel Studios and consulting company DMG Entertainment Group, 
partnered with SAPPRFT to assist in compliance with China’s strict censorship laws.173 
With an end goal of showing the film in China, Disney welcomed SAPPRFT to the sets, 
allowed Chinese product placement and creative input on the film, which included 
changing Iron Man’s nemesis from Chinese decent (as shown in the comic book series) to 
not Chinese or even really evil.174 This example shows a collaborative effort in which 
SAPPRFT is able to influence the narrative of soft power.  
Soft power, as deployed through films, may bring about a more acceptable stance 
toward China. As a successful authoritarian state, China presents an alternative model to 
the democratic one. Only in the past few years has China taken an openly sharp position 
vis-à-vis the United States, meaning that this posture may not be entrenched in the 
American public’s collective consciousness. Therefore, the American public may be more 
likely to accept a positive media portrayal of China, rather than recognizing Beijing as a 
threat to U.S. democracy and its security. Space-based films present an interesting case 
study for this as China is engaged in a competition with the United States in the field of 
space research.  
A. KEY FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH 
The film analysis in this section assesses U.S. space-themed films to determine 
whether they could aid China in making further inroads to the U.S. space sector and into 
the public’s good will. The concentration on space-focused films stems from China’s 
standing in the field as a competing global leader and desirous of space technology. China 
has competed in this field despite not receiving official assistance from the 16-country 
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International Space Program, which excludes China due to its potential access to classified 
military secrets.175 The space program represents great technological achievements and 
pride in the United States and China alike, and China’s focus on films in this area may 
illustrate the expansion of China’s influence in space exploration.  
 Because China has notoriously sought to access U.S. space program technology, 
the research here is narrowed down to a subset of films that focus on space. The assumption 
here is that due to China’s interest in space technology, its market will be interested in the 
space-based films and Beijing will take an interest in whether to expose their markets to 
such films coming out of the United States. 
 To determine the level of Chinese influence, the following indicators were used in 
selecting and assessing Hollywood movies.  
1. Is there content related to China? Content related to China includes 
main Asian-looking characters, locations filmed in China, visual imagery, 
involvement of Chinese actors, and Asian martial arts and plotlines.  
2. Was the movie approved by SAPPRFT and shown in mainland 
China? If approved, what are the themes that allowed them to get 
through? 
3. Was this film coproduced by a Chinese company or solely a 
Hollywood production? The research question will try to determine why 
propaganda is present in the films studied. If the films were coproduced, 
SAPPRFT would push for China for imagery of China and Chinese actors 
in positive roles. If the film was not coproduced and the same Chinese 
themes exist, the research assumes Hollywood placed the positive 
storyline to enter China’s strict market.  
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4. What are the box office sales to-date in the United States? These sales 
show how many people have been exposed to the Chinese themes in the 
United States. Through the building of a “bank of goodwill,” repeated 
positive imagery over time may influence viewers to believe what they are 
seeing as factual. 
5. What are the box office sales to-date in China? These sales will show 
how profits drive Hollywood content to enter the Chinese markets.  
6. How did critics rate the film? Movies that have obtained “critically 
acclaimed status” are significant because they draw audiences. Scores 
from known critics and moviegoers on websites Rotten Tomatoes and 
Metacritic were reviewed. The scores of these critic boards were averaged 
to produce a final number out of 100 possible points. Critics generally 
agree any film rated over 80 is critically acclaimed.  
The following six films were selected because of their popularity in the global 
market and space-related themes. 
1. Gravity (2013) 
The film Gravity (2013) provides two instances of the growing power of China’s 
soft power and its spreading propaganda. The film was not coproduced with China, yet 
Hollywood appears to appeal to Beijing in several scenes in order to increase its chances 
of the film being shown in the Chinese market. Specifically, the main character in the film, 
played by Sandra Bullock, seeks refuge in a Chinese space station and ultimately survives 
being stranded in space by utilizing a Chinese space capsule. The film shows cooperation 
between Chinese and Americans scientists. 
What is interesting is the film’s portrayal of the Chinese space station as 
technologically sophisticated. In reality, China has a single-module space station called 
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Tiangong-1, which it launched in 2011.176 The space station’s lifespan was limited and 
hosted only two sets of Chinese astronauts (taikonauts) on classified missions. In 2016, 
flight controllers lost control of the $1 billion space station, ultimately leaving it abandoned 
and decaying in space.177 The film instead portrayed China as having an advanced space 
program and also as a cooperating country in scientific exploration.  
Gravity was one of the last films in 2013 to gain SAPPRFT approval. With a 
production budget of $100 million, the U.S. box office sales were $274,092,705 and 
China’s $70,680,000, an additional 30 percent in revenue.178 Overall, the film was well 
received with an average rating of 90 out of 100, surpassing the 80 score to be labeled a 
“must-see film,”179 which means the narrative will have more impact as audiences rent or 
purchase the film. The implicit message is the United States relies on China for technology. 
The fact that China has stolen U.S. space technology may not be apparent to the audience 
whose views shape U.S. policy and who may become future leaders themselves. 
2. Rogue One: A Star Wars Story (2016) 
Star Wars’ reception in China was not as positive as it was in the United States and 
other Western countries, as China lacks the historical love affair with Star Wars and the pop 
culture that surrounds the trilogies.180 The original series was not shown during the initial 
release in the 1970s and 1980s, when the Chinese movie industry was closed to Hollywood. 
It was not until 1999 that China was first introduced to the series with Episode 1: The Phantom 
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Menace.181 Consequently, sales in China never reached the expectations of the filmmakers. 
Since then, Disney has made robust attempts to market Star Wars films with limited success. 
While The Phantom Menace earned only $4,100,273 in China, Rogue One in 2016 earned 
$69,484,899, showing a definite increase in interest.182 
Interestingly, Rogue One: A Star Wars Story (2016), had integrated the Chinese 
cultural tropes of war and sacrifice. During an interview, Chen Tao, who runs China’s 
biggest Star Wars fan website, explained the appeal, “For a lot of fans, the story of Rogue 
One made us think of our own country’s revolutionary history, a lot of characters in it were 
just like the Communist Party members who sacrificed themselves for the revolution.”183 
These tropes are possibly what got the film approved by SAPPRFT. While many 
Hollywood films present that theme, a more important factor might be the fact that Disney 
also incorporated Asian actors by casting martial arts champion Donnie Yen as well as 
actor-director-screenwriter Jiang Wen. With the casting of these two figures, Chinese 
martial arts appear prominently in the film, which detracts from the traditional lightsaber 
fighting many fans are used to seeing. In fact, Rogue One became the first Star Wars movie 
not to have a fight scene with lightsabers. Instead, the film relies on martial arts. 
Placing subtle propaganda into films is difficult and at times, it becomes apparent 
and can backfire. For instance, in the blockbuster film Iron Man 3, an operation to save 
Iron Man shows an all-Asian cast of doctors and nurses operating on the hero; adding the 
extra scenes backfired in the market.184 Many Chinese moviegoers felt the addition was 
inauthentic and disrupted continuity since the scene was shown only in the Chinese 
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market.185 Moreover, although Iron Man is a fictional character, he owns Stark Industries, 
which represents a U.S.-cleared defense contractor in the series. If there is any obvious 
propaganda, it is a foreign government having full access to top U.S. technology. In one 
scene an Asian doctor says, “Tony doesn’t have to do this alone—China can help.” Adding 
these scenes did not fare well with Chinese audiences, which illustrates that propaganda 
needs to be subtle as China is a sophisticated market that does not appreciate obvious 
propaganda. In comparison, in Rogue One, adding the two actors and Chinese cultural 
undertones appears to have worked as sales in China increased.  
3. Interstellar (2014) 
Interstellar (2014) is a space-themed Hollywood film where a team of astronauts 
and a former science engineer must save the earth from a global dust bowl that has rendered 
agriculture unsustainable. The team travels through a wormhole where answers to save the 
earth may lay in a far-off planet.186 The film was not coproduced with China, did not use 
positive Chinese themes, and used no noticeable Asian actors.  
The film did well at the U.S. box office, earning $188,020,017 and a respectable 
$121,990,000 in China.187 Audience critics gave Interstellar a score of 85 points, with 
172,880 viewers voting.188 Separately, 310 verified critics on Rotten Tomatoes scored the 
film at 71 points. Metacritic was generous, with 49 known critics providing a score of 96 
out of 100.189 The average rating among the three scores was 85 out of 100, which brought 
critically acclaimed status. These scores and the film’s revenue represent the impact 
Interstellar may have for an extended period on a willing audience. 
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Chinese propaganda in Interstellar appears to be minimal. Although the filmmakers 
did not cast famous Asian actors to appeal to the Chinese market, Alexander Lu, an 
uncredited actor who plays an Asian scientist for NASA, blends into the scenes. In contrast, 
the original script, developed in 2008, had 54 Chinese references that never made the final 
cut.190 For instance, the crew found China’s engineering robot-based operations in space.191 
They also discovered the remains of a Chinese mission on the ice planet with the Chinese 
crew dead from radiation poisoning.192 In another scene on the same planet, the crew 
discovered a Chinese base, built entirely by robots for China.193 What is interesting is that 
China is portrayed as having beaten the United States to inhabit the planet but it is not 
included in the movie, potentially because not surviving and having the United States 
accomplish the mission behind them may be viewed as a negative for China’s space industry. 
Although the failure of the Chinese base in the script could be viewed in a negative 
light, Beijing might have viewed it as positive propaganda showing a robust artificial 
intelligence and space program that was able to create such an engineering masterpiece 
without U.S. knowledge. This is evident as U.S. explorers in the film are surprised to find 
the Chinese base. Had the original 54 Chinese references stayed in the film, China’s 
sophisticated audiences might have rejected the pandering while Beijing benefited from 
the soft power approach among U.S. audiences. 
4. Hidden Figures (2016) 
Hidden Figures (2016) is a U.S. historical piece set during the Cold War with strong 
feminist and civil rights themes set against the grandeur of the U.S. space program.194 
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Hidden Figures covers the issue of racial segregation as it follows three African-American 
women who work for NASA and deal with the difficulties that surround women and 
African Americans in the workforce and everyday life. The space race against Russia 
provides context for the competition and importance of the space program in the 1960s. 
This film instills an appreciation for how the space race continues and still largely pits 
Communist countries, such as Russia and China, against the United States in the 
competition. 
Hidden Figures is relevant for this study because it shows the importance of 
NASA’s space program to the country. Hidden Figures earned $169,607,287 in the United 
States and scored an average of 87 out of 100 by critics.195 While Hidden Figures shows 
no obvious Chinese propaganda, it is a film set during an intense period of competition 
with Communist countries. In addition, the true portrayal of the United States 
discriminating against women and African Americans weakens the U.S. image. These 
prejudices may have presented a propaganda boost for Beijing. However, Hidden Figures 
was never shown on mainland China. One possible reason is the premise of the film, which 
despite showing racial and gender inequities, makes the U.S. space program appear strong 
and superior during the Cold War. Beijing does not like to promote the United States even 
though it benefits from promotions in Hollywood films. 
Another explanation is that China is self-conscious about perceptions of its own 
societal inequalities. A film like Hidden Figures could raise uncomfortable questions for 
the Chinese government. Hollywood film portraying U.S. historical achievements both 
scientifically and ultimately socially sometimes gets shut out of China. If the messages of 
this film, overcoming scientific and social hurdles, were objectionable to China, might a 
producer seeking to tap the China market skew history to make it more palatable for China? 
For instance, Hidden Figures could have been made more negative for the United States if 
it showed that broader patterns of discrimination persisted. It also did not help that the film 
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was set during the Cold War, an anti-Communist era, which is one more reason the film 
did not show in China. 
5. The Martian (2015) 
The Martian (2015) is a space-themed Hollywood film in which actor Matt Damon 
plays Mark Watney, a U.S. astronaut stranded on Mars. It depicts his inability to escape 
and his struggle to survive on a planet with no natural food source.196 The story line kept 
audiences in suspense as they watched Watney create ways to grow food on Mars through 
items left behind by his team. He also grappled to find ways to signal NASA, the message 
being that he needed to be rescued. His ingenuity throughout the film to overcome the odds 
captivated audiences. The film highlights the team of NASA scientists who overcome 
many trials during the film. However, after several failed attempts by the team to rescue 
Watney, NASA turned to China and their space program, which was ultimately able to 
supply what the United States lacked, resulting in Watney being brought home safely.  
The storyline of two countries banding together to save Watney was inspiring to 
audiences and cast China as a global leader and cooperative nation in space technology, 
the opposite of the actual China that is continually engaged in espionage against U.S. space 
technology.197 However, incorporating Chinese elements to appeal to Beijing meant the 
film was positioned for acceptance by SAPPRFT and shown in China, where it earned 
$94,932,731 (and $228,433,663 in the United States).198 The film was shown in over 68 
countries and was highly claimed by critics with a rating of 87 out of 100.199 
The story of The Martian was first posted a chapter at a time by Andy Weir on his 
website where he had a small group of readers that provided him with feedback. Writing 
the story was a “labor of love” for him, as he had no idea it would ever be published or 
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filmed.200 Asked what his motivation was for having China come to the aid of Watney, 
Weir responded: 
The reason I had China help out is because the whole theme of the novel is 
how people band together to help those in need. And a cool international 
cooperation element seemed like a good idea. To show that the whole planet 
Earth was trying to save Watney. And at that time, China was really hitting 
space hard. They’d recently had their first manned spaceflight and were 
working on a space station. Plus, they were talking about sending people to 
the Moon. Plus, I admit I have my own little opinion in there. I would like 
the U.S. and China to cooperate in space. I think it’s stupid that we don’t. 
It’s clearly not a national security issue—we cooperate with Russia. We 
cooperated with the Soviet Union back in the middle of the Cold War.201 
Weir’s explanation shows idealistic individuals in the entertainment industry may 
unwittingly assist foreign powers by helping spread their soft power—a role that the 
Soviets called “useful idiots.”202 Weir is not by any means an idiot, but his line of thinking 
can be problematic when a country is engaged in soft-power competition. Weir’s example 
shows the need for better counterintelligence outreach to those who write and produce for 
Hollywood. To quote a decidedly non-space related film, “The world is made for people 
who aren’t cursed with self-awareness.”203  
With over $323 million made on this movie theme between the U.S. and China, it 
is conceivable that Hollywood will continue to follow films that show partnerships, even 
when not a reality.204  
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6. Arrival (2016) 
The film Arrival (2016) is a space-themed film with extraterrestrial life. Its plot 
revolves around a linguist, played by Amy Adams, who is hired by the U.S. government to 
communicate with aliens that have come to Earth. The linguist spends a lot of time in the 
film learning to communicate with the aliens while trying to ward off government 
approaches. Through much trial and tribulation, the linguist discovers the aliens are here 
to provide a gift of their language, which Earth will need in the future.205 The film earned 
critically acclaimed status, having won critics’ favor with an average score of 86.206 It 
earned $100,546,139 in the United States and $15,884,890 in China.207 
The film places China in the spotlight with a central role for Chinese General 
Shang, who collaborates with world leaders to understand why the aliens have arrived. The 
film captures a patriotic moment for China as Shang deploys the Chinese navy, robust and 
aggressive, toward an alien ship. China’s language experts deliver a message to the aliens 
at the Shanghai site, stating that the aliens have 24 hours to leave or face destruction. Shang 
urges all other nations to follow suit. General Shang’s ultimatum is covered in the news 
broadcast. A U.S. reporter declares, “Tonight, China becomes the first world power to 
declare war against the aliens.”  
Shang’s nickname in the film is “Big Domino” because, as one U.S. government 
official explains in the film, whatever Shang does, history has shown at least four other 
nations will follow. This characterization proves problematic in the film because Shang 
withdraws China’s scientists from the international mission, stating, “China no longer 
trusts the aliens who want to divide us. Humanity must be protected. China calls for talks 
at the U.N.” This strong stance to make the aliens leave results in Russia, Pakistan, and 
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Sudan following China’s lead, all pulling out of the international efforts to stand together 
and figure out why the aliens are there.  
In one dramatic scene, the U.S. government intercepts a call from a secure network 
in which a rogue Russian scientist tries to send new information to the United States. While 
on the call, the Russian scientist is executed. 
Eventually, China stands down and the aliens leave. During a reunification gala for 
world leaders, Shang is shown in a positive light as a collaborator as he speaks to the film’s 
protagonist, who had helped Shang understand the importance of the alien arrival.  
A disturbing part of Arrival is the moment a Russian government leader executes 
one of its scientists, who is caught leaking information to the United States. The Russian 
incident might have been a plus for China, as public corruption is a capital offense in China. 
This scene may serve as a warning about the draconian measures that China could take vis-
à-vis disloyal individuals. Interestingly enough, the executed scientist did not faze Russian 
audiences, as the film made $4,403,096 in Russia.208 
Out of all of the space-themed films reviewed, Arrival has the most references and 
scenes beneficial to China. One area of propaganda in the film that China may benefit from 
is the positive portrayal of its navy. China has stolen technology that has brought China’s 
navy to its current strength. For those who do not know, this movie may lead them to 
believe that China is a world power that warrants following, as did the other four countries 
in the movie. In reality, China’s navy followed, technologically speaking, the United States 
through the theft of U.S. naval technology. The underlying message of the movie has the 
possibility to help create a more conducive environment for private-sector joint ventures 
and even military-to-military exchanges that can be manipulated by China to acquire 
sensitive technology and proprietary information without U.S. entities being witting to 
China’s actions. 
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B. SUMMARY 
Recent portrayals of China as an important world power in the aforementioned 
films contribute to China’s soft power. An analysis of these films helps demonstrate how 
China has been able to use its influence and growing economic power in an important 
market to shape what Hollywood produces.  
The combination of Beijing’s desire to control what Chinese audiences see and 
Hollywood’s desire to benefit from a vast Chinese market has led to de facto Chinese co-
opting elements of the film industry. The cumulative effect of this is that Hollywood self-
censors its work to clear Chinese government gatekeepers who control access to the 
significant Chinese market. Meanwhile, U.S. audiences are exposed to pro-China content, 
as shown in Table 3 of the Critic Score matrix created for this thesis. 
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The cumulative impact of these space-based films might be the promotion of 
Chinese entities as cooperative partners in fields of science and technology, with whom the 
United States and other nations can work toward a common cause. By bolstering its image 
in film, China might entice American society to believe the narrative being promoted. 
China may leverage this portrayal to acquire technology and restricted information because 
cooperation brings with it opportunities for Chinese intelligence operatives to exploit. This 
eventually may lead to Chinese operatives gaining access to American intelligence. 
Allowing China to use Hollywood as a propaganda tool to enhance its image as a 
comparable world power, albeit built on stolen technology, is a homeland security issue. 
This practice introduces distorted, foreign-sponsored perspectives that may be harmful to 
the United States in the long run and has implications for U.S. policymakers. 
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The United States needs to identify Beijing’s use of soft power and curb China’s 
influence on Hollywood, specifically the co-opting of the U.S. entertainment industry in 
order to shape U.S. public opinion. China’s growing influence in Hollywood necessitates 
new approaches and partnerships to protect the United States from Beijing’s expanding 
influence and the attendant geopolitical and geo-economic implications that degrade 
elements of U.S. national power. The United States must respond to China’s behavior, but 
it cannot throw up walls and block China through tariffs and other protectionist policies. 
China is not like the Soviet Union, which was not engaged significantly in global economy 
during the Cold War and did not enjoy the level of access to the United States that China 
has now.209 In responding to China, the United States must find a diplomatic agreement 
that starts with a firm understanding of sharp power and how China is using it.  
This chapter makes recommendations for the U.S. government on how to address 
the problem of China’s emerging influence on Hollywood, which is part of the American 
public sphere. Three potential actions that can be undertaken include China’s removing the 
34-film cap, conducting awareness outreach with U.S. audiences and decision-makers, and 
other government action, such as applying FARA laws, which are currently being 
expanded to include media, to China’s acquisition of U.S. media companies. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If nothing is done to stop China’s expanding influence, Beijing will continue to 
utilize its soft power through propaganda that enhances its national power and influence 
across the world. After generations, the United States may forget about spies like Greg 
Dongfan Chung and the reality of Chinese achievements through stolen technology; it may 
start to treat China as a global leader and even a partner in its space program. Allowing 
China’s CPD to influence Hollywood strengthens China, weakens the United States, and 
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threatens its democracy. In this country, media is a space for communication and critical 
thinking in society, which is essential for democracy. It is an important democratic 
institution that needs to remain open to allow free movement of ideas and communication 
in a large country such as this. Ironically, China’s use of this free space to promote itself 
as a successful and friendly authoritarian state undermines the institution and its role place 
by spreading the notion of a friendly authoritarian state as an acceptable part of the 
American psyche. 
The United States currently has few tools in place to assess foreign challenges such 
as the one from China. The tools include the National Threat Identification and 
Prioritization Assessment, which is produced by the National Counterintelligence Security 
Center (NCSC) to inform the president, policymakers, and senior officials of emerging 
threats.210 Another tool is CFIUS, an inter-agency committee charged with vetting foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. assets the government relies upon for infrastructure.211 In addition, the 
FARA of 1938, as amended in 22 U.S.C. § 611 et seq., began in response to the discovery 
that German propaganda agents were in the United States actively disseminating 
misinformation. FARA became a tool to protect the United States from foreign propaganda 
by requiring agents of a foreign government to declare themselves as such.212 An agent’s 
registration under FARA provides transparency about their role as a representative of a 
foreign government to parties—including those within the U.S. government—with whom 
that foreign agent interacts. FARA continues to aid with identifying and prosecuting 
Chinese spies who enter the country undeclared and steal from the United States to benefit 
China.  
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1. Remove the 34 Film Cap 
To protect the United States from Chinese influences within the context and drivers 
for policymaking, the leadership in U.S. government needs to pursue the removal of film 
restrictions and limits in China’s market by pressuring the World Trade Organization. Free 
trade agreements without film caps will provide a competitive space for Hollywood to 
produce the films it wants without influence from China’s government. Although the 
market demand may remain pro-China, more access will allow more films to enter China 
providing opportunity for films that show a different perspective. Removing the 34-film 
cap will open true competition and allow films to be made through contest and not by 
government control through SAPPRFT. Lifting restrictions on films will undercut China’s 
attempts to influence U.S. audiences because the entertainment industry will not 
manipulate content just to appease Beijing and, thus, not advance its desired narratives. 
The United States needs to take a more serious look at agreements between China and the 
World Trade Organization to ensure that its interests are protected in relation to cultural 
industries along with other sectors.  
These changes are pressing as China may not need Hollywood as they are 
developing their own skill to make good movies that appeal to their own culture and others 
like the United States. China is proving this as it is set to surpass U.S.-made films with its 
own in 2020.213 Last year, Wolf Warrior 2, a Chinese film, was the biggest hit in China 
with $854.2 million in sales, beating the new Disney film Star Wars: The Last Jedi, which 
made $42.6 million in China.214 Wolf Warrior 2 may be the beginning of a global reach 
having played in U.S.-partnered countries like Australia, New Zealand, and the UK. 
2. Outreach to the Public 
Beijing is very aware of how film can influence their people in China and abroad, 
as shown in Chapter III. China has empowered its propaganda department to ensure films 
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that do not meet its criteria will not make it into their market, and films that are played 
internationally, that do not portray China in a good light, are discouraged.  
Through this research, I pondered the idea of U.S. government control to protect 
the United States from Beijing’s influence and what control would work. I reviewed 
creating an option of coverage that would mirror CFIUS in the sense that CFIUS is a 
gatekeeper of control by foreign countries from purchasing U.S. government infrastructure. 
This new control system would look at foreign influence and guard against it by reviewing 
soft-power approaches. My research of collaborating with colleagues led me to believe this 
type of control would only mirror Beijing’s SAPPRFT, which is a control I concluded 
would not work in the United States due to the desire many Americans have to keep the 
U.S. government out of their business.  
Sharing information about the media setting and China’s influence with U.S.-
cleared defense contractors, think tanks, and academia is the beginning of protecting our 
democracy and country from China. Bringing information to the public to enhance their 
awareness can be accomplished through various government organizations such as the 
NCSC, which specializes in threat assessments. NCSC’s assessments help to understand 
how U.S. adversaries are carrying out and achieving their missions. NCSC threat 
assessments may bring awareness in the public space and civil society through strategic 
partnerships, best practices, vulnerability assessments, and presentations to outline current 
and emerging foreign threats. These activities will start the process of disseminating 
collected intelligence to the American people to be better informed. It will also help 
establish a collaborative framework for creating incentives for the industry.  
As expected, both Hollywood and U.S. audiences will respond to different things, 
and most likely studio executives will not care about creativity as much as they will the 
bottom line. Writers, on the other hand, may have a creative vision and will prefer not to 
see it ruined by political considerations. Target audiences for these briefings in Hollywood 
would be individuals responsible for producing content such as the directors and writers. 
These groups represent potential tripwires that can provide information and recognize 
influence activities. Raising awareness in the industry can be a force multiplier and a way 
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to harden the target of U.S. adversaries. This is especially true in the case of writers such 
as Andy Weir, who may be unaware about how China benefits from U.S. writers’ work. 
Getting Hollywood to change its artistic vision will be difficult. In the last 10 years, 
companies seeking to delete or mask scenes from R-rated films to bring the rating to a 
family friendly rating of PG have been the grounds for lawsuits and congressional debates. 
These lawsuits and debates illustrate the lengths Hollywood will go to protect content and 
vision.215 Nevertheless, Hollywood has shown that it can respond to markets by deleting 
scenes Beijing finds offensive. For example, in the editing phase, a scene in Men in Black 
3 in which a small group of ethnic Chinese has their memories erased by a government 
agent was deleted.216 Another example in Skyfall’s original version shows a French-hired 
gunman killing a Chinese security guard.217 These changes appeared to charm Beijing and 
consequently improve Hollywood studios’ opportunities to have their film played in the 
lucrative China market.  
3. Government Action 
The National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment (NTIPA) is a tool 
utilized by the NCSC to inform the president, policymakers, and senior officials of 
emerging threats. Since the issue of foreign influence is a significant public concern, the 
NTIPA could ensure the significance of influence is brought to the attention of U.S. leaders 
who can create change. In formulating an understanding of the threat, the assessment needs 
to factor in how foreign governments attempt to manipulate the U.S. media and Hollywood. 
It is possible that the president may receive this suggestion through NTIPA and act on this 
emerging threat. 
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a. Expansion of the Counterintelligence Foreign Investment in the United 
States to Include Hollywood 
If China continues to make significant purchases in Hollywood, Beijing will gain 
greater control of the U.S. narratives. CFIUS needs to take a serious look at soft-power 
purchases that can turn into sharp power as discussed in Chapters I and II. Executive Order 
11858 provides an opportunity to investigate China’s investments as it states, “CFIUS may 
consider any other factors that the committee finds appropriate in determining whether a 
transaction poses a national security risk.”218 
In the last 40 years, there have been several classified examples in which CFIUS 
has blocked Chinese investments or Chinese investors have withdrawn their application 
from the process because they knew they would not pass the stringent process. These 
blocks kept China from purchasing companies that provided or supported the United States 
government’s infrastructure. A recent unclassified example is the proposed acquisitions of 
U.S. telecommunications by China-owned Huawei and ZTE. Both companies were 
identified in an investigative report by the U.S. House of Representatives in October 2012 
that suggests “China has the means, opportunity, and motive to use telecommunications 
companies for malicious purposes.” Enabling such acquisitions would have detrimental 
consequences to protecting the United States from foreign adversaries who would have full 
access to government communications. Chinese manipulation of Hollywood contributes to 
these types of acquisitions by creating portrayals of China as a cooperative and non-
threatening partner. Therefore, CFIUS needs to take a closer look at American cultural 
industries as a potential source of influence by foreign powers.219 
b. Foreign Agents Registrations Act 
The FARA laws are currently expanding to include media in efforts to curb foreign 
influences in U.S. affairs. This expansion of FARA would also apply to China, which is 
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trying to purchase U.S. media companies for increasing propaganda and control methods. 
While there is no history to show this will benefit the United States, it is arguably a step in 
the right direction to help keep in check those who wish to do the United States harm. 
B. CONCLUSION 
This thesis provided an analysis of how China is using Hollywood to advance 
Beijing’s interests. Based on the research, it becomes clear that China is using Hollywood 
to advance its soft power by manipulating the production of pro-Chinese themes in 
Hollywood films. Therefore, the U.S. government and its citizens are responsible for taking 
action to protect their country and its democracy.  
Implementing a strategy to disrupt Chinese manipulation of the U.S. entertainment 
industry is easier said than done. The U.S. is a proponent of the free market system that 
focuses on profit as a driving factor. The U.S. private sector that controls the means of 
production and distribution includes Hollywood and is motivated by financial gain, rather 
than by national security concerns. Enlisting its assistance will require converting concerns 
about national security into implications for companies’ profits. Without buy-in from this 
industry, U.S.-elected officials will be reluctant to take actions that affect such economic 
interests. However, a change in the public perception could pressure the industry into 
changing its content.  
Both government and non-government entities are intended customers for the 
research and recommendations presented in this thesis. The NCSC, in particular, needs to 
be informed about the importance of this subject for future policy and action. The totality 
of work on foreign efforts to exploit the U.S. creative sector contributes directly to the 
NCSC’s responsibility in preparing the NTIPA, which was designed to inform 
policymakers and senior officials about current and emerging foreign intelligence threats 
to U.S. national security. The U.S. government, through exploring new ideas to counter the 
threat, must optimize enterprise capabilities through partnerships with non-government 
entities and experts, including think tanks and Hollywood. The objective of partnering with 
these groups is to advance awareness about propaganda and its effect on democracy.  
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Multiple stakeholders can be engaged to further the mission of countering Chinese 
influence in Hollywood. First, the individuals responsible for producing content, directors 
and writers, are potential tripwires who can provide valuable information about interactions 
with the Chinese market as far as what China is asking for and the reasons they are asking. 
Engaging Hollywood will help stakeholders recognize influence activities and understand 
the significance of these activities by those with knowledge of China’s strategies. Directors 
and writers are likely to be receptive, since heavy-handed influence activities are 
antithetical to independent vision. Second, engaging think tanks, such as RAND, which 
focuses on national security, can orient Hollywood toward the concerns about influence. It 
can also establish relationships that will produce new ideas, which can then be used to 
mitigate the threat. All of this information can be developed in an unclassified framework, 
making it useful for the broadest range of entities. Raising awareness and academic interest 
turns external entities into force multipliers. 
The focus here on space-themed films presented some limitation. There well over 
200 films in different genres that could be analyzed for propaganda to illustrate connections 
between China’s influence objectives and the audiences that China desires to affect. The 
scope of space-themed films is a methodology based on a sector that the U.S. and China 
are competing over. Future research may include covering the 34 films that were played in 
the Chinese market each year, which would then become the measurement for 
understanding Chinese influence. The same research can also focus on films that were 
rejected and analyze why China did not want those particular themes played in its market, 
in contrast to films that were accepted. 
Some people believe it is okay to have Chinese influence and vice versa in a 
globalizing world. In an era of globalization, when cultural ties cut across national borders 
and international commerce creates new perceptions about the world, there is an argument 
to be made that American audiences demand a more inclusive sensibility on the screen. 
However, even if a greater focus on China is not driven by Beijing, China stands to gain 
from positive depictions and may encourage existing affinities. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to demonstrate a direct cause-and-effect relationship between propaganda and 
changes in audience perception; that requires a survey which is beyond the scope of this 
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research. Some scholars argue that Hollywood is reacting to market demand, rather than 
seeking to placate China and thereby influence viewers. 
As foreign influence has become a topic of concern in the United States, there is a 
growing body of literature that examines how foreign entities attempt to achieve desired 
changes in public perception through manipulating social media. This thesis attempts to 
bring awareness to how a foreign entity, specifically China, can attempt to influence 
through more traditional avenues. More research is needed to understand the impact of 
these attempts and, if successful, the implications for the future.  
China and the United States represent two different ideologies. The United States 
is a democracy, and China is an authoritarian state. Global competition for power includes 
a competition of ideal models of governance. As China’s soft power expands, the idea of 
an acceptable authoritarianism spreads. This is happening in smaller countries like 
Pakistan, where many are frustrated at their democratic country because they see China 
expanding both economically and politically.220 The state and public are saying the 
Chinese present a better model, which may be a threat to democracy.221 The softening of 
perceptions that China is presenting opportunities also opens doors ideologically to what 
China represents politically: authoritarianism. Such soft power may affect democratic 
thinking in United States as well.  
In the course of this research, China moved SAPPRFT into the powerful 
Communist Propaganda Department.222 This move indicates the seriousness with which 
China is pursuing influence in the entertainment industry, which includes Hollywood 
filmmakers hoping to access the enormous Chinese box office. Through awareness, 
strategic outreach to Hollywood and the use of the NTIPA, presidential action can take 
place to help mitigate China’s soft-power approach. Further negotiations with the World 
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Trade Organization may also expand the restriction into the Chinese market, which would 
loosen the bands the Chinese government has on what is viewable by its people, therefore 
allowing for more freedom in the market. 
The United States needs to identify Beijing’s use of soft power, specifically the co-
opting of the U.S. entertainment industry in shaping U.S. public opinion. China’s growing 
influence in Hollywood necessitates new approaches and partnerships to protect the United 
States from Beijing’s expanding influence that brings with it geopolitical and geo-
economics implications that degrade U.S. element of national power. China’s infiltration 
of content and distribution can influence public opinion, which provides the context and 
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